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Marriages of Convenience: Explaining Party
Mergers in Europe
Raimondas Ibenskas, University of SouthamptonWhile party mergers can have important implications for the development of party systems, their causes have not
been studied in a large-n comparative study. Using a new data set that covers 24 European democracies in the post-
war period, this study shows that parties merge to overcome electoral thresholds or to form one of the two or three
largest parties with an important role in the formation of government coalitions. However, mergers are not motivated by
the goal to establish a majority, strongly dominant or largest party. The costs of mergers include ideological differences
and various transaction costs related to reaching and implementing merger agreements. These transaction costs are lower
if parties previously cooperated and if the partisanship of their voters is low.Why do political parties merge? The literature doesnot yet provide a systematic comparative study onthis question, even if party mergers, deﬁned in
this research as the amalgamation of two or more indepen-
dent parties into a single party organization, have important
implications for democracy. Mergers (fusion) can contribute
to the consolidation and higher quality of new democratic re-
gimes by facilitating the formation of stable parties, avoid-
ing the “wastage of votes” and reducing excessive party sys-
tem fragmentation (Cox 1997; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In
the short term, however, by changing party supply, mergers
reduce, or even destroy, the information value of party labels
for voters and could impede voter representation and ac-
countability. Either way, understanding the outcomes of the
process of party system formation and stabilization in older
democracies, as well as the instability of party systems in a
large number of third wave democracies, is impossible with-
out considering the role of party fusion. Furthermore,mergers
can signiﬁcantly change party systems in those countries with
institutionalized party systems. For example, the fusion lead-
ing to the formation of the Christian Democratic Appeal in
the Netherlands substantially reduced party system fragmen-
tation and contributed to the elimination of the Catholic-
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,to a number of case, or small-n, comparative studies. This
study advances the knowledge on party mergers both the-
oretically and empirically. In theoretical terms, the research
develops an explanatory framework that identiﬁes the costs
and beneﬁts of mergers by building on the previous studies
of this phenomenon and the theories of government and
electoral coalitions and legislative party switching. This frame-
work integrates some relatively well-established explanations
with more innovative arguments on how potential gains in
ofﬁce beneﬁts affect mergers. Speciﬁcally, building on the ty-
pology of legislative party systems by Laver and Benoit (2015),
we argue that fusion may be motivated by the goals to es-
tablish a party that has a legislative majority, is “strongly dom-
inant,” or is one of the two or three key parties in the party
system. Additionally, parties may merge to achieve legislative
plurality. Empirically, the study provides the very ﬁrst large-n
analysis of mergers using an original data set that we created
speciﬁcally for this research by the careful examination of the
party systems in 24 established and new European democracies
in the postwar period. The results of statistical analyses support
the existing arguments in the literature and one of the ofﬁce-
seeking hypotheses.
The next three sections of the article present the theo-
retical framework, data and measurement issues, and the re-
sults of statistical analysis. The ﬁnal section concludes.THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS
The causes of party mergers are relatively understudied both
theoretically and empirically. The literature consists mostly
of case studies examining mergers in Canada (Bélanger and
Godbout 2010), France (Haegel 2004; Knapp 2003), Germany
(Olsen 2007; Poguntke 1998), Italy (Bordandini, Di Virgilio,
and Raniolo 2008; Rizzi 1974), Japan (Kohno 1997), Malawi
(Rakner, Svasand, and Khembo 2007), the Netherlands (Lees,
Hough, and Keith 2010), South Korea (Kim 1997; Park 2010),
and other countries. Ware (2009) and Coffé and Torenvlied
(2008) provide more theoretical accounts of mergers. The two
most common factors explaining mergers in those studies
are ideological or policy similarities and electoral gains due
to the increased ability of component parties to overcome
electoral thresholds. Other, less stressed factors include the
access to ﬁnancial resources, rebranding opportunities, pre-
vious cooperation, electoral decline, the loss of governmen-
tal ofﬁce, and the change of the party leadership and/or the
dominant coalition. Another approach is to examine merg-
ers in the context of broader phenomena, such as electoral
coordination (Cox 1997), party formation, change, and per-
sistence (Bolleyer 2013; Hug 2001; Rose and Mackie 1988;
Spirova 2007), or electoral volatility (Birch 2003; Casal-Bertoa,
Deegan-Krause, and Haughton 2015; Sikk 2005).Given the lack of a clear theory of mergers in the litera-
ture, we draw on the theories explaining political phenom-
ena that are conceptually related to fusion. Speciﬁcally, we
identify the costs and beneﬁts (in terms of votes, ofﬁce, and
policy) incurred by parties when forming electoral and gov-
ernment coalitions and by individual legislators who switch
parties. We then examine (also building on the existing lit-
erature on party fusion) how much the costs and beneﬁts
of these phenomena are applicable to mergers. Electora
and government coalitions, unlike mergers, are temporary
and do not involve the integration of party organizations
Legislative party switching, in contrast, can be conceptual-
ized as a permanent coalition akin to a merger, but the mem-
bers of this coalition are an individual member of parlia-
ment (MP) and his or her new party rather than multiple
parties. Taking these differences into consideration allows
us to identify the costs and beneﬁts of mergers. More speci-
ﬁcally, in the remainder of this section we ﬁrst discuss elec-
toral and ofﬁce beneﬁts. Next, we focus on the costs related
to ideological compromises as well as various transaction costsElectoral beneﬁts
A number of studies show that parties form electoral coa-
litions to increase their legislative seat share (Blais and
Indridason 2007; Ferrara and Herron 2005; Golder 2005
Kaminski 2001). Coalitions are vote or seat superadditive
(subadditive) if they provide their members with a higher
(lower) share of the vote or seats than the total share that
these parties would obtain when running separately (Kamin-
ski 2001). Superadditivity may arise because of the ideo-
logical closeness between parties or more likely owing to the
mechanical and strategic effects of electoral institutions (i.e.
the coalition is more likely to overcome electoral thresholds
and attract strategic voters than its member parties; Kamin-
ski 2001, 296). According to the latter logic, parties form
electoral coalitions if they expect a bonus in terms of leg-
islative seats due to disproportional electoral institutions
(Duverger 1954). Such gains in legislative seats are likely
when the combined vote share of the parties in the coali-
tion is close to the electoral threshold (Blais and Indridason
2007).
Mergers, in a similar way to electoral coalitions, can be
motivated by smaller parties’ desire to obtain a higher seat
share by overcoming electoral thresholds (Bélanger and God-
bout 2010; Coffé and Torenvlied 2008; Knapp 2003; Olsen
2007; Rakner, Svasand, and Khembo 2007). These studies
suggest that a higher permanency of a merger, as compared
to a electoral coalition, may be both an advantage and dis-
advantage in gaining additional legislative seats. On the one
hand, being temporary, electoral coalitions are more ﬂexi-
1. Here and below, the simple majority of seats is assumed to be a
winning threshold.
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,ble in responding to changing circumstances in the electoral
market (Ware 2009, 91). On the other hand, in comparison
to an electoral coalition, a merged party may run more ef-
ﬁcient election campaigns, achieve higher clarity of its pol-
icy positions, or be more credible in re-positioning itself to
a more attractive location on the main dimension of party
competition (Bélanger and Godbout 2010; Ware 2009). While
future studies should examine the contextual conditions that
affect the relative advantages of electoral coalitions and merg-
ers in terms of helping parties to overcome electoral thresh-
olds, the most relevant implication of these arguments for
this study is that both forms of party cooperation are suit-
able for achieving this goal. This suggests the following
hypothesis:
Electoral Thresholds Hypothesis. A merger is more
likely if the expected size of the merged party is close
to the electoral threshold.Ofﬁce beneﬁts
An important strand in the literature on legislative party
switching emphasizes the incentives for individual switch-
ing created by parties’ competition for governmental ofﬁce.
Speciﬁcally, to capture how potential gains in ofﬁce payoffs
lead to legislative party switching, Laver and Kato (2001)
and Laver and Benoit (2003) have applied such concepts from
the coalition literature as power indices (Banzhaf 1965; Shap-
ley and Shubik 1954) and dominant parties (Peleg 1981).
A similar logic may also explain mergers, especially because
they involve the change of party afﬁliation of multiple leg-
islators, and thus they have a greater potential than indi-
vidual party switching to improve the bargaining position of
the component parties in the process of coalition formation.
To develop one explanatory account about how the goal
of achieving a stronger bargaining position drives mergers,
this research builds on the exhaustive classiﬁcation of legis-
lative party systems provided by Laver and Benoit (2015).
This typology captures the impact of “constitutionally bind-
ing arithmetical constraints on legislative bargaining” (276)
that arise due to the need for coalitions to win the majority
support in the legislature. Speciﬁcally, Laver and Benoit (2015)
distinguish between ﬁve types of party systems depending
on whether the largest party can form a winning coalition
on its own and, if not, whether two-party winning coalitions
among the three largest parties are possible.1 Thus, their
classiﬁcation includes: type A system with a single winning
party; type B system with a “strongly dominant” largest party
that can form a two-party coalition with either the second-or the third-largest largest party while the latter two can not
form a winning coalition; type C or “top-three” system, in
which any pair of the three largest parties can form a win-
ning coalition; type D or “top-two” system, in which the only
two-party winning coalition is that between the two largest
parties; and type E or “open” system, in which no two-party
winning coalition is possible. They show that the type of
legislative party system has a strong effect on the empirica
patterns of the duration of government formation, the type
of governments that form, and government termination.
Laver and Benoit’s typology implies that parties’ bargain-
ing positions, and, consequently, their expected ofﬁce ben-
eﬁts, depend on the type of the legislative party system and
parties’ size rankings. This is because these two variables
affect whether the party can undermine a winning coalition
that excludes it by tempting at least one party in this coa-
lition to defect and form a two-party winning coalition with
itself (Laver and Benoit 2015, 280). Speciﬁcally, this typology
of party systems points to three situations when the party is in
a privileged bargaining position: (1) when it has a full leg-
islative majority in the system with a single winning party
(2) when it is the largest and strongly dominant party, and
(3) when it is one of the three largest parties in a top-three
system or one of the two largest parties in a top-two system
We therefore expect that the probability of a merger increases
when the merged party is likely to be in one of these priv-
ileged positions. In what follows, we discuss each of these
situations in turn, and derive testable hypotheses.
Party merger to obtain legislative majority. The ﬁrst case
is most straightforward, as the majority party is by deﬁ-
nition included in all winning coalitions. Thus, we expect
that mergers that provide the component parties with ful
majority are more likely.
Majority Party Hypothesis. A merger is more likely
if the expected size of the merged party is close to the
majority legislative threshold.Party merger to establish a strongly dominant party.
Strong dominance also provides the party with a privileged
bargaining position because it can form two-party winning
coalitions with either the second- or the third-largest party
and possibly some of the smaller parties, while all other
winning coalitions have to include the second- and third-
largest parties. This means that, if the largest party is ex-
cluded from a winning coalition, it can undermine this co-
alition by tempting either of these two parties (and possibly
some other parties) to form a two-party winning coalition
with itself (Laver and Benoit 2015, 280). In contrast, if either
of the second- or third-largest parties, and possibly some of
2. An alternative empirical test would establish whether the merger
would lead to a situation in which (1) the merged party would become the
largest party, (2) it would be able to form winning coalitions with the
second- and third-largest parties, and (3) the latter would not be able to
obtain the majority of seats together. However, this approach is problem-
atic because of the high uncertainty about the postmerger party system.
Speciﬁcally, even small changes in the legislative seat shares of any of the
parties due to, for example, party switching by individual legislators or
changes in parties’ electoral support, could lead to changes in the type of
the party system (Laver and Benoit 2015).
3. The results of this analysis are provided in appendix B.
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,the smaller parties, are excluded from a winning coalition,
each of them can tempt only the largest party to defect and
form a two-party winning coalition.
To derive a testable implication of this theoretical logic,
we seek to uncover the size of the party at which it is most
likely to become strongly dominant.2 To this end, table 1
presents the constraints on the size of the three largest parties
in the system with a strongly dominant party (and other types
of legislative party systems). The table indicates that the
largest party can become strongly dominant only if its seat
share is higher than half the winning threshold but lower than
the winning threshold (see the second cell from the top in
the third column of the table).
To identify the value of this size threshold more precisely,
we draw on the computational analysis of Laver and Benoit
(2003), which provides all possible conﬁgurations of leg-
islative seat distributions (6,292,018 in total) in the 100-seat
legislature when the number of legislative parties varies be-
tween 3 and 10. For each set of legislatures with a different
number of parties, and for each value of party size, we com-
pute the share of parties that belong to all possible combi-
nations of the type of the legislative party system and party
size rank (for example, the largest party in a top-two system,
the second-largest party in a top-three system, the third-
largest party in an open system, etc.).3 The solid line in
ﬁgure 1 shows, for the values of party size between 1% and
50%, the share of these combinations (the mean value across
eight sets of legislatures with a different number of parties
is used) in which the party is strongly dominant. In line with
the results reported in table 1, the share of combinations
with a strongly dominant party is above 0 only when party
size is between 25% and 50%. However, this share is higher
than 0.5 only when party size is between 38% and 50%. The
latter result is intuitive because, when the largest party is
closer to the majority of seats, there is a broader range of
the values of the size of other parties compatible with the re-
quirement that each of these parties can form a winning coa-
lition with the largest party.While the results presented in table 1 and ﬁgure 1 do not
specify the exact size threshold under which the party becomes
strongly dominant, they suggest that it is most likely when
the expected size of the merged party is close to 40%. Thus
we expect that, if the merger is driven by the goal to es-
tablish a strongly dominant party, it should be more likely
when the expected size of the merged party is close to 40%.Strong Dominance Hypothesis. A merger is more
likely if the expected size of the merged party is close
to the threshold of 40%.
Party merger to found one of the two or three largest
parties. The three largest parties in a top-three system or
the two largest parties in a top-two system, while in a weaker
position than the majority or strongly dominant party, also
have important advantages in coalition formation. In a top-
three system any pair of the three largest parties can form a
winning coalition, and all majority coalitions include at least
two of them. Thus, if any of these parties is excluded from a
majority coalition, it can tempt either of the remaining two
parties in this coalition to defect by forming a winning coa-
lition with itself. A top-two system privileges the two largest
parties, since the only two-party winning coalition possible is
that between them, and all majority coalitions have to in-
clude at least one of these parties. Thus, if one of the two
largest parties is excluded from a winning coalition, it can
persuade the other party in this coalition to defect by estab-
lishing a majority coalition with itself.
The party is most likely to become one of the three
largest parties in a top-three system or one of the two largest
parties in a top-two system when its size is somewhat above
half the winning threshold. Speciﬁcally, according to table 1
the largest and second-largest parties must have at least one
quarter of seats in a top-three system. Moreover, the size of
the third-largest party equal to or above one quarter of seats
is a sufﬁcient condition for a top-three system. The size of
the largest party above one quarter of seats is also a neces-
sary condition for a top-two system. Furthermore, if the
largest and third-largest parties can not form a winning co-
alition, and the merged party becomes the second-largest
party, the seat share of at least one quarter of seats is a suf-
ﬁcient condition for the merged party to achieve a top-two
system.
Additionally, ﬁgure 1 shows that the share of the combi-
nations of party system type and party size rank at which
the party is either one of the three largest parties in a top-
three system or one of the two largest parties in a top-two
system is higher than 0.5 when party size is between 29%
and 36%. Thus, the seat share of around 30% of the total
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;provides the party with a good chance to hold this advan-
tageous position.
Half the Winning Threshold Hypothesis. A merger
is more likely if the expected size of the merged party
is close to 30%.
Conditions under which a merger is unlikely to provide
ofﬁce beneﬁts. Other combinations of party system type
and party size rank than those described above are less likely
to provide parties with a privileged bargaining position. Spe-
ciﬁcally, in a system with a majority party, all parties but
the majority party are irrelevant for the formation of win-
ning coalitions. In a system with a strongly dominant party,
the ability of the latter to potentially play all other parties off
against each other disadvantages these parties even if some
of them (i.e., the second- or third-largest parties and, possibly,
some smaller parties) are able to establish two-party winning
coalitions with the strongly dominant party. In a top-three
system, all but the three largest parties are so-called dummy
parties that are not pivotal in the formation of majority coa-
litions. Moreover, all but the two largest parties in a top-two
system are disadvantaged because the two largest parties dom-
inate the process of coalition formation. Finally, open systems
do not privilege any of the parties because none of them can
participate in a two-party winning coalition.
Importantly, these combinations of party system type and
party size rank are more likely to occur when the size of theparty is below half the winning threshold. Figure 1 shows that
the share of the combinations of party size rank and party
system type in which the party is in one of these less ad-
vantaged positions is more than 0.5 when party size is below
28%. Moreover, table 1 demonstrates that the size of al
but the two largest parties must be below half the winning
threshold in the systems with majority and strongly domi-
nant parties. In a top-three system, the seat share of all but
the three largest parties is by deﬁnition lower than one
quarter of the total. Similarly, in a top-two system all but the
two largest parties must have the seat share that is lower than
half the winning threshold. The size equal to or below half
the winning threshold is also either the sufﬁcient (for the
largest party) or necessary (for the second-largest party) con-
dition for open systems.
Party merger to form the largest legislative party. Fur-
ther insights on when mergers could potentially provide
ofﬁce beneﬁts can be derived from the sequential bargain-
ing models of government coalition formation, which fre-
quently assume that the largest party gets the right to form
a government and predict that it would be included in gov-
ernment as its leading party (Glasgow, Golder, and Golder
2011). Thus, a merger that establishes the largest legislative
party could lead to substantial ofﬁce gains (Kohno 1997
Spirova 2007). A similar argument has been made in the case
of electoral coalitions: Golder (2006, 174) argues that even
seat subadditive electoral coalitions may be formed if theyTable 1. The Size of the Three Largest Parties under Different Types of the Legislative Party SystemConditions for the Size of Individual PartiesLegislative Party System Party System Constraints P1 P2 P3A: Single winning party S1 ≥W S1 ≥W S3<W=2
(sufﬁcient) (necessary)B: Strongly dominant party S11 S2 ≥W ; W=2< S1<W S3<W=2
S11 S3 ≥W ; (necessary) (necessary)
S21 S3<WC: Top-three S11 S2 ≥W ; W=2≤ S1<W S2 ≥W=2 S3 ≥W=2
S11 S3 ≥W ; (necessary) (necessary) (sufﬁcient)
S21 S3 ≥WD: Top-two S11 S2 ≥W ; W=2< S1<W S2 ≥W=2 S3<W=2
S11 S3<W; (necessary) (sufﬁcient if (necessary)
S21 S3<W S11 S3<W)E: Open S11 S2<W; S1<W=2 S2<W=2 S3<W=2
S11 S3<W; (sufﬁcient) (necessary) (necessary)
S21 S3<WNote. Based on Laver and Benoit (2015). P1, P2, and P3, and S1, S2, and S3 denote the three largest parties and their seat shares, respectively. An additional
constraint for the systems of types B, C, D, and E is S1 ! W. The cells in bold font indicate a majority or strongly dominant party; the cells in italics show
the one of the top three parties in type C system or one of the top two parties in type D system. Proofs are provided in appendix A.
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,increase parties’ chances to become the largest bloc in the
legislature, thus obtaining the right to form a government
(see also Ibenskas Forthcoming). This suggests that
Largest Party Hypothesis. A merger is more likely if
the expected size of the merged party is close to the size
of the largest legislative party.
The role of institutions. Institutions such as the investi-
ture vote, bicameralism or semi-presidentialism also affect the
formation of government coalitions and, by extension, ofﬁce-
seeking incentives for mergers. The detailed examination of
the effect of those institutions on mergers is beyond the scope
of this research, but additional analyses presented in appen-
dix D (appendix available online) suggest very limited evi-
dence to the notion that these institutions affect mergers.Ideological differences and transaction costs
While mergers may provide parties with substantial electoral
and ofﬁce beneﬁts, they can also impose signiﬁcant costs.
Ideological compromises are one type of such costs. Accord-
ing to the coalition theory, ideologically distant parties are
less likely to form government and electoral coalitions (De
Swaan 1973; Budge and Laver 1992; Golder 2006). Switcher
MPs are also more likely to switch to those parties whosepolicy preferences are closely aligned to their own (Despo-
sato 2006; Heller and Mershon 2008; McElroy and Benoit
2009). Many studies on mergers also identify ideological sim-
ilarities between parties as the key precondition for mergers
(e.g., Coffé and Torenvlied 2008).
Ideology Hypothesis. Mergers are more likely be-
tween ideologically close parties.
The literature on government and electoral coalitions
suggests two types of transaction costs that are also equally
or, possibly, even more relevant in the case of mergers. First
party elites need to spend a lot of time and effort when bar-
gaining on a joint policy program, conﬂict resolution mech-
anisms, the division of ofﬁce positions in the merged party
(including its leadership) and, possibly, the sharing of elec-
tion candidacies and executive ofﬁce positions. Furthermore
parties need to integrate their organizations at both centra
and local levels. Overall, time and effort spent on achieving
merger agreements and implementing them imply signiﬁ-
cant opportunity costs in terms of ofﬁce, policy and votes
as also suggested to some extent by previous studies on merg-
ers (Haegel 2004; Ware 2009).
Second, parties face difﬁculties in achieving credible com-
mitments when forming government coalitions due to the
combination of the uncertainty about the preferences ofFigure 1. Combinations of party system type and party size rank: shares for party size. Note that shares for each combination of party system type and party size
rank are provided in appendix B.
Volume 78 Number 2 April 2016 / 000potential coalition partners and the risk of their opportu-
nistic behavior (Lupia and Strøm 2008). In a similar vein,
mergers involve a substantial risk of opportunism by part-
ner parties; consequently, trust between them is crucial for
completing the merger process (Lees et al. 2010; Ware 2009).
Especially the smaller component party faces a risk that its
larger partner would renege on a merger agreement by re-
voking its previous policy concessions or increasing its share
of ofﬁce positions or election candidacies above that agreed
at the time of the merger. The component party that is a
victim of such a defection by its partner is nevertheless un-
likely to withdraw from the merged party owing to the costs
related to the reestablishment of an independent party or-
ganization.4
Previous experience of governing together creates inertia
that reduces bargaining costs and decreases the uncertainty
about partners’ behavior in the coalition government by in-
creasing their familiarity with each other (Bäck and Dumont
2007; Franklin and Mackie 1983; Martin and Stevenson
2010; Warwick 1996). It follows that previous cooperation
in government and electoral coalitions could also reduce the
bargaining costs of a merger and increase the credibility of
a merger agreement. Many issues that parties bargain over
when founding a merged party are similar to those that they
need to resolve when forming government and electoral
coalitions. Thus, previous compromises on policy or agree-
ments on the division of electoral candidacies and/or gov-
ernment portfolios and procedures for conﬂict resolution
can provide a viable focal point in the merger negotiations.
Moreover, previous cooperation experience allows party
leaders and members to ﬁnd out about each other’s prefer-
ences and establish trust (Coffé and Torenvlied 2008). In-
deed, as Mair (1990, 131) argues, parties merge when “exter-
nal friendships . . . prove overriding.”
Previous Cooperation Hypothesis. Previous coop-
eration increases the probability of a merger.
Moreover, the party switching literature suggests that par-
tisan voters value the loyalty of legislators (Mershon and
Shvetsova 2013) and are unlikely to follow the switcher
MP to his or her new party (Desposato 2006; Kreuzer and
Pettai 2009). Similarly, in the case of mergers, the costs4. For example, previous supporters of this component party may
have transferred their loyalties to the merged party. Voters may also
consider the members of the splinter party as noncredible because of
frequent changes in their party afﬁliation (Mershon and Shvetsova 2013).
Legal requirements for the registration of a new party further increase the
costs of the formation of a splinter party (Hug 2001).
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party may be substantial (Knapp 2003; Mair 1997). The per-
manent alliance of a party with previous competitors may lead
to the exit of many activists and the defection of partisan
voters. Voter partisanship tends to increase with the age of the
party (Converse 1969; Dalton and Weldon 2007; Huber,
Kernell, and Leoni 2005; Lupu and Stokes 2009), which
suggests that the costs of a merger are lower for younger
parties.5
Party Age Hypothesis. Mergers are more likely be-
tween younger parties.
The literatures on partisan dealignment (Dalton and
Wattenberg 2000) and party organizational models (Katz
and Mair 1995) suggest alternative hypotheses on the effect
of party age. According to the ﬁrst literature, the decline
in voter attachments to established parties in most West-
ern democracies in the last few decades should have in-
creased the propensity of these parties to merge with other
parties. The second literature implies that the emergence
of the catch-all and especially cartel parties with weaker
linkages to the society should have also increased the pro-
pensity of established parties to collude through mergers
(Krouwel 2012).DATA AND MEASUREMENT
To test our theoretical expectations, we assembled a new
data set recording mergers in 24 countries in the European
Union with a population of at least 1 million. This data
set considers almost all democratic electoral periods (280
in total, listed in appendix C) in these countries in the post-
war period. The data set provides information about the
identity of component and merged parties, their electoral
performance, and a number of other predictor variables used
in the statistical analysis presented in the next section.
Collecting data on mergers that involve minor parties,
most of which are also of little substantive importance, is
challenging owing to the lack of reliable data sources about
these parties. For instance, 111 parties or electoral coalitions
participated in the 1991 election in Poland. Tracking orga-
nizational developments of this number of parties is close to
an impossible task. Thus, the data set records mergers only5. Younger parties also tend to be less institutionalized internally
(Harmel and Janda 1994), both in terms of the routinization of internal
rules and procedures and the attachment of the members to the party
(value infusion). Greater institutionalization on both of these dimensions
should reduce the propensity of parties to change through a merger.
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at least 1% of voters in the last legislative election before
the merger.6 The data set also does not consider as com-
ponent parties those splinter groups that were established
previously in the same electoral period and thus had no
electoral record before they merged.
In total, the data set includes 94 mergers formed by
216 parties. These mergers occurred in 59 electoral periods,
more than one ﬁfth of the total number of periods in the
sample; 79% or 84% of these merger parties were formed
by two parties. The data set includes two very large merg-
ers—the Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria formed
by 11 parties in 1997 and the merger of 8 parties leading to
the establishment of the Union of Democratic Centre
in Spain in 1978.7 Figure 2 presents the distribution of the
merged parties across countries. The ﬁgure shows a rela-
tively large variation at the country level. On average, post-
Communist democracies have more mergers than estab-
lished democracies of Europe, which substantiates previous
more impressionistic accounts in the literature (Gallagher,
Laver, and Mair 2011; Mair 1997).
The data to be used in the statistical analysis are orga-
nized in a dyadic format and includes all possible pairs of
political parties in a given electoral period, regardless of
whether they merged or not. The unit of analysis is a party-
dyad-electoral-period and the dependent variable is dichot-
omous (1—merger between the parties took place in the
given electoral period, 0—absence of a merger). As an ex-
ample of how data are structured, consider the 1987 elec-
tion in the United Kingdom, in which ﬁve parties obtained
at least 1% of the vote: the Conservatives, Labour, Liberals,
Social Democrats (the latter two in a electoral coalition),
and the Scottish Nationalist Party. For the 1987–92 electoral
period in the United Kingdom the data include 10 dyads.
The dependent variable takes the value of 1 for the dyad
of the Liberals and the Social Democratic Party (because
these two parties merged in 1988) and 0 for the remaining
9 dyads. There are in total 210 dyads that resulted in merg-
ers, but 83 of these were the result of the two “mega-
mergers.” Since the inclusion of these two mergers would
have a substantial effect on the results of statistical analy-
ses (Poast 2010), the sample used for the main analysis
whose results are presented below excludes two electoral6. In the cases where two or more parties participated in an electoral
coalition and their individual vote shares are not available, they were
estimated as the product of the coalition’s vote share and the share of seats
of the party from the total share of seats of the coalition.
7. In fact, each of these mergers involved more parties, but the esti-
mated vote share of these other component parties was below 1%.
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mergers occurred. The sample without these two periods in-
cludes 121 dyads that resulted in mergers.8Independent variables
To test the hypotheses focusing on ofﬁce and electoral ben-
eﬁts of mergers, we construct ﬁve variables that take into
consideration how close the expected support of the merged
party is to different thresholds implied by the hypotheses.
In the models presented below the expected support of the
merged party is measured as the total vote share of the parties
in the dyad in the election that took place at the beginning
of the electoral period under consideration. The use of vote
shares, rather that seat shares, is more in line with the elec-
toral thresholds hypothesis, since the former captures more
accurately the chances of small parties without parliamentary
representation to overcome electoral thresholds. The use of
parties’ vote shares to test the ofﬁce-seeking hypotheses is also
justiﬁable, given that mergers are motivated by potential ofﬁce
beneﬁts not only in the current term (when small partners
without legislative representation can not help the larger party
to enter government) but also in future legislative terms (when
the seats gained as a result of the representation of the voters ofFigure 2. Number of party mergers in Europe in the postwar period8. Six more dyads besides the ones resulting from “mega-mergers”
were removed because one more merger took place in Spain (in the period
between 1977 and 1979).
.208.185 on February 03, 2016 07:06:37 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Volume 78 Number 2 April 2016 / 000the smaller partner can improve the chances of the larger
party to enter government).9
Lijphart’s (1994) effective electoral threshold in the last
election before a merger, whose values are provided by Carey
and Hix (2011), captures the size of the electoral threshold.
The vote share of the largest party in the election that took
place at the beginning of the electoral period is used as a
measure of the size of the largest party threshold. If one of
the parties in the dyad is already the largest party, the sup-
port of the second-largest party captures the size of this
threshold. The other thresholds, implied by half the win-
ning threshold, strong dominance, and majority party hy-
potheses, are 30%, 40%, and 50%, respectively. With parties’
expected support and threshold values at hand, we com-
pute each measure as the square root of the absolute dif-
ference between these two quantities. The use of square root
takes into consideration that the same absolute increase in
the expected size of the merged party matters more if the
size of the party is close to the threshold.10 Lower values of
each measure therefore indicate that the expected support
of the merged party is closer to the threshold. Thus, parties
in the dyads that have lower scores on these measures have
stronger incentives to merge.
Information on party families is used to estimate ideo-
logical differences between political parties. Each party in
the data set has been categorized as belonging to one of
11 party families based on the coding provided by Döring
and Manow (2012); for the parties not included in that
database (mostly in Central and Eastern Europe), we have
used various other sources, such as the handbooks on po-
litical parties, in particular, Bugajski (2002). As explained
in greater detail in appendix C, the degree of ideological
closeness was measured by two dichotomous variables that
capture whether parties belong to the same party family
or similar families (e.g., Communist and Social Democratic
or Christian Democratic and conservative parties). The use
of party families (as opposed to more precise estimates of
party ideology provided by the Comparative Manifesto Proj-
ect or expert surveys) maximizes the number of cases cov-
ered at the cost of data quality. Appendix C justiﬁes this9. However, alternative empirical analyses that use seat shares lead to
similar results as those presented in the next section.
10. The square root transformation accounts better (e.g., in compar-
ison to the logarithmic transformation) for the theoretical argument that
the thresholds that provide ofﬁce or electoral beneﬁts to parties are not
very ﬁrmly established, and therefore differences between party size and
these thresholds matter substantively even if party size is quite far away
from the threshold. The results of statistical analyses, however, remain
substantively similar when the logarithmic transformation is used.
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those alternative sources is too low for the large-n analysis
conducted in this study.
To test the previous cooperation hypothesis, two dichot-
omous variables are used. The ﬁrst variable indicates whether
the parties in the dyad were part of the same government in
the previous electoral period. The second one captures their
participation in the same electoral coalition in the election
that started the electoral period under consideration. Elec-
toral coalitions are operationalized here as joint candidate
nominations or lists. In contrast to weaker forms of electoral
cooperation, such as public commitments to govern together
after the election, joint candidates or candidate lists involve a
greater degree of cooperation, which should substantially de-
crease bargaining costs and increase the trust between parties.
Finally, the average of the logged age of the parties in the dyad
captures the strength of the partisanship of their voters. Ap-
pendix C provides the descriptive statistics of the variables
used in the analysis.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The observations in the sample are clustered by parties, elec-
tions, and countries, which raise the possibility that some
unobserved variables at the level of these units have an effect
on the dependent variable. To account for this issue, random-
effects logistic regression models (Gelman and Hill 2007;
Greene 2008) with varying intercepts at the level of countries
and electoral periods, are used. Table 2 presents six model
speciﬁcations, which differ with regard to the inclusion of the
variables that capture potential ofﬁce gains. Speciﬁcally,
since there is high correlation between the ofﬁce-seeking
variables, models 1–3 and 5 include one of these variables
each; model 4 includes all variables derived from the typol-
ogy of party systems by Laver and Benoit (2015) but not the
difference between the expected size of the merged party and
the size of the largest party; ﬁnally, model 6 includes all pre-
dictor variables.
Regression analyses provide substantial leverage in ac-
counting for mergers: they support most theoretical ex-
pectations.11 Given how the variables that test the electoral
thresholds hypothesis and the ofﬁce-seeking hypotheses are
constructed, we expect to ﬁnd a negative coefﬁcient indi-
cating that an increase in the values of each of these var-11. The mean predicted probability of a merger for the dyads that
actually resulted in mergers is much higher (0.15) than for the dyads that
did not lead to mergers (0.01) (based on the estimates of model 6). Also,
the results remain robust in a number of additional analyses presented in
appendix D.
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that this is indeed the case for the electoral threshold hy-
pothesis. When the logged difference between the expected
support of the merged party and the effective electoral
threshold is changed from one standard deviation below the
mean (1.5) to themean (3.3), the probability of amerger is 45%
lower (the 95% conﬁdence interval is 23% and 61%).12
Turning to the hypotheses that capture potential ofﬁce
beneﬁts of a merger, the results support only the half the
winning threshold hypothesis. Speciﬁcally, a change in the
square-rooted difference between the expected support of
the merged party and the threshold of 30% from one
standard deviation below the mean (2.7) to the mean (3.9)12. The estimates of model 1 are used for computing this and other
quantities presented in this section.
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ﬁdence interval is 54% and 20%). In contrast, the coefﬁcients
of the variables that capture parties’ incentives to establish the
largest party, a strongly dominant party, or a majority party,
are not statistically signiﬁcant in any of the models. This is
an interesting ﬁnding that requires a more detailed expla-
nation than permitted by the available space here. However,
it should be noted that this result is in line with one of the
key explanations of minority governments, according to
which they form when the electoral costs of the participation
in government are high (Laver and Schoﬁeld 1990; Mitchell
and Nyblade 2008; Strøm 1990). In a similar vein, the for-
mation of plurality or majority parties through mergers may
have higher electoral costs in comparison to the establishment
of merged parties with the seat share below one third of the
total. Speciﬁcally, in the countries with multiple socialTable 2. Random-Effects Logit Models of Party MergersModel 1 Model 2 Model 3.208.185 on Febru
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tp://www.journals.ucModel 5 AM
hicago.edu/t-and-c).Model 6Intercept 23.36*** 25.05*** 25.57*** 24.62*** 24.84*** 24.59***
(.76) (.92) (1.10) (1.28) (.63) (1.29)Close to electoral threshold 2.34*** 2.19 2.15 2.25* 2.19* 2.25*
(.10) (.10) (.10) (.11) (.08) (.11)Close to 30% 2.40*** 2.68*** 2.68***
(.11) (.19) (.20)Close to 40% 2.07 .60 .60
(.12) (.44) (.44)Close to 50% .00 2.15 2.15
(.13) (.36) (.37)Close to the largest party 2.14 2.02
(.09) (.10)Ideological similarity 1.15*** 1.16*** 1.17*** 1.17*** 1.17*** 1.17***
(.13) (.13) (.13) (.13) (.13) (.13)Electoral coalition 2.64*** 2.56*** 2.55*** 2.62*** 2.56*** 2.62***
(.24) (.24) (.24) (.24) (.24) (.24)Government coalition .89** .89** .91** .94*** .91*** .94***
(.27) (.28) (.28) (.28) (.27) (.28)Mean (ln [party age]) 2.35** 2.31 * 2.30 * 2.33 * 2.33 * 2.33 *
(.13) (.13) (.13) (.13) (.13) (.13)Log likelihood 2478.08 2484.02 2484.20 2475.53 2483.02 2475.51
N 10,661 10,661 10,661 10,661 10,661 10,661
No. of electoral periods 278 278 278 278 278 278
No. of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24
Election-level variance .56 .58 .58 .55 .58 .55
Country-level variance .64 .59 .59 .64 .57 .64Note. Entries in the table are coefﬁcients of the maximum likelihood logit models with random intercept terms at the level of countries and electoral
periods. Standard errors in parentheses. Given how the variables that test ﬁve “threshold hypotheses” are constructed, we expect to ﬁnd negative coefﬁcients
indicating that an increase in those variables leads to a decrease in the probability of a party merger.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
*** p ! .001 (two-tailed).
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amined here, mergers that lead to the establishment of very
large parties are likely to leave a large share of the electorate
unrepresented, leading to the emergence of viable new parties.
The comparison between the merger of the Socialist Party
(PSI) and the Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI) in Italy in
1966 and the absence of a merger between the Centre Party
(C) and the Liberal People’s Party (FP) in Sweden in the
late 2000s and early 2010s illustrates the logic behind the
half the winning threshold hypothesis. While the two pairs
of parties were similar with regard to most factors of merg-
ers, the extent to which mergers could help them to obtain
a stronger bargaining position was different.13 The com-
bined support of the social-democratic parties in Italy in the
1963 election was approximately 20%. Their merger aimed
to create the “third force” in Italian politics, a party that
would have undermined the strong dominance of the largest
party—the Christian Democracy—by being able to form a
majority coalition either with it or with the second-largest
party, the Italian Communist Party (the latter obtained 26%
of seats in 1963; Rizzi 1974). Had this plan succeeded, the
party system would have shifted from the system with the
strongly dominant Christian Democracy to a top-three sys-
tem in which any two-party coalitions among the Christian
Democrats, Socialists, and Communists would have had a
legislativemajority. In contrast, Swedish liberal parties did not
merge even if the merged party would have likely become
the third largest party. The combined size of the two liberal
parties (14%–15% of the vote) would have been insufﬁcient
to switch the type of the party system from a top-two system,
in which the Social Democrats (30%–35% of the vote) and
the Moderates (25%–30% of the vote) were the major parties,
to a top-three system.
Ideological similarity also emerges as a very important
predictor of mergers. While this variable has three cate-
gories, it is treated as continuous in the analyses presented
below, since the effect of the parties in the dyad belonging
to “similar” families is approximately twice lower than that
of the parties belonging to the same family (both effects are
relative to the category “different families”). More precisely,13. All four parties were electorally viable and therefore mergers
would have increased their vote-seat ratio only marginally. Also, ideo-
logical differences between the parties were limited and they had the ex-
perience of government cooperation. Speciﬁcally, in the early 1960s the
PSI shifted toward the centre-left positions already occupied by the PSDI,
and the two parties participated in government together since 1963 (Rizzi
1974). Similarly, in the 2000s the Centre Party adopted a liberal program,
which was similar to that of the FP. The two parties were members of
centre-right governments in the period between 2006 and 2014.
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the probability of a merger is, all else being equal, 219%
higher (the 95% conﬁdence interval is between 150% and
304%).
The effect of previous electoral cooperation is still stronger.
A premerger electoral coalition increases the probability of a
mergerby13.9times(8.9and21.7),allelsebeingequal.Theeffect
of the experience of being in government in the previous legis-
lative term is weaker, but still substantial: it increases the prob-
ability of a merger by 2.4 times (1.4 and 4.2). The case of the
Union for a PopularMovement (UMP) in France illustrates the
importance of previous party cooperation: it was established by
diverse smaller center-right parties only after a long period of
electoral and government cooperation between those parties
(Haegel 2004).
Younger parties are also more likely to merge in line
with the party age hypothesis (and in contradiction to the
alternative expectations about the effect of party age on
mergers). The increase in the average logged age of parties
in the dyad, from the mean value (2.5) to one standard
deviation above the mean (3.7), decreases the probability of
a merger by 34% (52% and 10%). The comparison between
liberal parties in Lithuania (the Liberal Union [LLS] and the
Centre Union [CS] and the Netherlands (the People’s Party
for Freedom and Democracy [VVD] and D66), whose av-
erage logged age in the early and mid-2000s was close to the
mean value of the sample (the parties in Lithuania) and one
standard deviation above the mean (the Dutch parties),
demonstrates the importance of voter and member attach-
ments as a crucial factor of mergers. Following their national-
level electoral cooperation in the 2000 parliamentary election,
the two liberal parties in Lithuania merged in 2003, both to
assure their survival as legislative parties and to establish the
leading center-right party. Being founded in the early 1990s,
neither of the two parties had strong partisan following in the
electorate, which resulted in their wildly ﬂuctuating electoral
fortunes in the period between 1992 and 2000. Thus, the risk
of partisan backlash by voters was limited. In contrast, while
the Dutch liberal parties considered a merger in the mid-
2000s, the widespread dislike of the VVD and the merger
idea itself by the voters and members of D66 and, to a smaller
extent, different organizational cultures of the two parties,
were key reasons for why the merger did not take place de-
spite the cooperation of the parties in government in the
1990s and mid-2000s and similar party programmes (Lucar-
die and Voerman 2006, 133–41).
CONCLUSION
The goal of this research was to understand why parties
choose to form permanent coalitions with other parties.208.185 on February 03, 2016 07:06:37 AM
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fthrough the foundation of a uniﬁed party organization. The
research proposes an explanatory framework that empha-
sizes various costs and beneﬁts of mergers and tests this
framework using a new data set on mergers in 24 established
and new democracies in Europe. The framework incorporates
a variety of the costs of mergers, such as ideological differences
between parties and various transaction costs related to reach-
ing and implementing merger agreements. These transaction
costs are lower if parties previously cooperated and if the par-
tisanship of their voters is low. Furthermore, the framework
suggests that the expected beneﬁts of mergers include not only
the improved ability of the component parties to overcome
electoral thresholds, as suggested by multiple previous studies,
but also better chances to obtain executive ofﬁce. Speciﬁcally,
parties could use mergers to achieve legislative majority or
strong dominance, to establish the largest party, or to constitute
one of the two or three key parties in the formation of gov-
ernment coalitions.
The empirical analyses demonstrate the importance of
ideological differences, transaction costs and electoral ben-
eﬁts for the formation of merged parties. They also show
that mergers aremotivated by parties’ goal to establish one of
the two or three key players in the party system with enough
seats to participate in two-party winning coalitions. How-
ever, no support was found to the hypotheses that mergers
are motivated by parties’ goal to establish majority, strongly
dominant, or largest parties, which provides an important
theoretical puzzle for future research.
These ﬁndings have important implications for the lit-
erature on government and electoral coalitions. With regard
to the former, the study uncovers how party competition for
the executive ofﬁce shapes party identities and size through
mergers. With regard to the latter, this article shows that
incentives for mergers created by potential electoral and
ofﬁce gains are quite similar to those provided by electoral
coalitions. At the same time, many electoral coalitions serve
as the ﬁrst, intermediary step toward the full integration of
party organizations. Building on these insights, future re-
search should further investigate how parties choose be-
tween different forms of cooperation.
Furthermore, the ﬁndings of this study suggest that the
costs and beneﬁts of mergers may be quite different from
those considered in the literature on legislative party switch-
ing. Some of these differences arise because a merger changes
the party afﬁliation of multiple legislators at once. Thus, for
example, while the beneﬁts and costs of party switching by
individual legislators depends on how advantaged the largest
two parties are in coalition formation (Laver and Benoit 2003),
a merger may be motivated by a bigger goal of achieving such
advantages. Explanations of individual party switching and
mergers differ also because a merger involves the integrationof component parties’ organizations. Consequently, the trans-
action costs related to achieving and implementing a merger
agreement are higher than in the case of individual party
switching. Thus, the literature on party switching would ben-
eﬁt from the theoretical and empirical distinction between
the switching of individual legislators and the switching related
to various forms of party instability, including party mergers
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